Alexis O. Kaya - Conceptual Review and Theoretical Essay
Abstract
Neural continuity is commonly considered in structural terms: the persistence of neurons, synaptic relationships, and the architecture in which memories are distributed. But the structural persistence of a brain is not equivalent to the continued occurrence of conscious experience. The same broadly preserved anatomy supports wakefulness, dreaming, anesthesia-associated unresponsiveness, and widely differing affective and perceptual states. This article develops the Biochemical Continuity Problem: which dynamic electrochemical and bodily regulatory conditions, beyond a structural map, must be maintained or reconstituted for a neural system to support conscious experience? Rather than proposing that particular molecules independently generate consciousness, the argument distinguishes anatomical connectivity, cellular and synaptic physiology, large-scale dynamics, organismic regulation, and subjective experience. Evidence from neuromodulation, anesthesiology, psychiatry, interoception, and neuroimmune signaling establishes the importance of state-dependent physiology while leaving the metaphysical sufficiency of any one account unresolved. The proposal is made testable by specifying comparisons between structural-only and multilevel dynamical models, and by identifying interventions that vary biochemical state without imposing comparable anatomical change. It also clarifies an essential limit: recovery of consciousness following an interruption, preservation of personal identity, and reproduction of the same conscious subject are distinct claims. A genuinely adequate account of neural persistence must explain not only how the architecture survives, but also how that architecture becomes functionally available to experience.
Keywords: consciousness; neurochemistry; neuromodulation; connectome; anesthesia; interoception; biochemical continuity; neurotenacity; personal identity.
1. A Preserved Brain Is Not Necessarily an Experiencing Brain
Imagine a brain whose neurons, axons, dendrites, and synaptic contacts have been preserved in extraordinary anatomical detail. Nothing obvious has vanished from the map of its connections. One might say that its architecture has survived. Yet this claim does not answer whether the brain is active, whether its cells can sustain membrane potentials and synaptic transmission, whether its networks can coordinate activity, or whether anything is being experienced. The distinction between an intact map and an experiencing system is the point of departure for this essay.
In earlier contributions to The Architecture of Mind, Neurotenacity was advanced as a proposed framework for the persistence of organized neural systems, while related articles considered memory accessibility, neuronal renewal, identity, degeneration, and the physiological protection of neural tissue. Those inquiries identify an indispensable biological problem: how can a system preserve the consequences of experience while continuing to change? But they also expose a possible limitation of the architectural metaphor. A surviving arrangement of parts does not necessarily entail an ongoing process. The score can remain legible when an orchestra is silent; a city can retain its streets while its circulation has stopped. In a living brain, however, the difference is not merely poetic. Structural connectivity and active neural function are experimentally distinguishable.
A connectome specifies connections at some chosen scale and resolution. It does not, on its own, specify the immediately prevailing concentrations of neurotransmitters, receptor states, intracellular signaling cascades, extracellular ionic composition, metabolic capacity, membrane excitability, or the activity of ascending arousal systems. These variables are not decorative additions to the nervous system. They participate in determining how its pathways operate. Marder (2012) made this point particularly clear: neuromodulators can reconfigure the function of circuits despite the persistence of their underlying anatomical connections.
The question, therefore, is not whether neural architecture matters. It plainly does. It is whether an account of persistence restricted to architecture can explain the presence, absence, character, and continuity of conscious experience. I call the problem arising from that distinction the Biochemical Continuity Problem. Its scientific core concerns the dynamical conditions that support conscious states. Its more ambitious philosophical extension concerns what, if anything, these conditions imply about the persistence of a conscious subject. The two must not be confused.
2. What a Connectome Can—and Cannot—Tell Us
Neuroscience has compelling reasons to map the connections of the brain. The organization of long-range and local pathways constrains information exchange; regional lesions can disrupt abilities that depend upon those pathways; synaptic changes participate in learning and memory. Anatomical organization is therefore neither incidental nor dispensable. Nonetheless, the description of structure alone is incomplete as a specification of an operating biological system.
Consider two circuits with similar cellular identities and wiring. Alter the balance of inhibitory and excitatory conductances, modify the activation of neuromodulatory receptors, or change the ionic environment, and the circuits may show very different patterns of firing, synchronization, and responsiveness. At the level of a whole brain, changes in arousal, attention, and effective communication can be dramatic while the macrostructural organization remains substantially unchanged. That does not mean the functional brain is separate from physical matter; it means that a structural diagram omits a large part of the physical state of that matter (Marder, 2012; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005).
This requires a careful distinction among three notions often grouped under the word structure. A macroscale connectome represents pathways among regions; a microscale connectome maps synaptic contacts; an exhaustive physical description would additionally include receptor distributions, channel kinetics, cellular states, molecular machinery, and potentially every causally relevant physical variable. An argument against the sufficiency of a static connection map is not therefore an argument against physicalism, computational explanation, or the possibility that an appropriately detailed dynamical simulation could reproduce relevant functions. The more completely “architecture” is defined, the less meaningful a sharp separation between architecture and chemistry becomes.
The proper target of the present argument is thus precise: anatomical connectivity alone does not determine conscious state without the physiology that governs activity on that connectivity. This proposition is consistent with, rather than opposed to, network neuroscience. It also guards against a common conceptual mistake: inferring from the persistence of memory-relevant structure that either consciousness is continuously present or the same subject must necessarily persist across any conceivable intervention.
3. Neural Function Is an Electrochemical Event
Neurons function as living electrochemical systems. Action potentials depend upon membrane conductances and ionic gradients; synaptic responses depend upon vesicular release, postsynaptic receptors, and the properties of target cells. The significance of a connection cannot be inferred solely from whether two neurons touch or form a synapse. The same anatomical pathway can be facilitated, suppressed, or recruited into different functional assemblies according to its momentary physiological conditions.
Glutamatergic and GABAergic signaling contribute centrally to excitation and inhibition, but a simple opposition between the two does not capture network behavior. Inhibition can sharpen representations and organize rhythms; excitation can drive signaling or, under pathological conditions, destabilize circuits. Acetylcholine influences attention and cortical state; noradrenergic systems are implicated in arousal, adaptive responsiveness, and task engagement; dopaminergic systems influence learning, valuation, and motivation. Their effects depend on receptor subtype, location, ongoing activity, and interactions with other systems. To speak of “the dopamine state” or “the serotonin level” as if either uniquely defined an experience would be scientifically misleading (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Marder, 2012).
Moreover, biochemical regulation is inseparable from metabolic support. Resting potentials, neurotransmitter cycling, axonal transmission, and synaptic homeostasis require continuous energy. Oxygen and glucose delivery, astrocytic functions, mitochondrial metabolism, and the regulation of extracellular ions all contribute to the viability of neural dynamics. A preserved anatomical scaffold that cannot sustain these processes is not a functioning brain. It may retain useful structural information, but structural survival and physiological competence are different achievements.
The term neurochemical ecology is proposed here as a conceptual description of these interdependent conditions, not as the discovery of a new molecular pathway. An ecology is a system of relations: local transmitters interact with diffuse modulatory projections; neurons interact with glia and vessels; metabolism influences excitability; bodily and circadian signals alter the conditions in which cortical and subcortical circuits operate. The explanatory question concerns these coordinated relationships rather than a privileged “consciousness chemical.” Chemistry matters because it configures dynamics within an already organized nervous system.
4. One Architecture, Multiple States: Sleep and Anesthesia
The rapid transitions between waking, sleep, and anesthesia provide unusually useful constraints on any theory of consciousness. During ordinary sleep, cerebral anatomy remains largely the same as during wakefulness, yet sensory responsiveness, network dynamics, and subjective experience change. Sleep is not necessarily dreamless, and dreaming itself illustrates that consciousness of an internally generated world can occur without normal engagement with the external environment. Wake–sleep transitions depend on distributed regulatory circuits, homeostatic pressures, circadian mechanisms, and interacting neuromodulatory populations (Saper et al., 2010).
General anesthesia offers a further intervention. Different anesthetics act through distinct molecular targets and network effects, including changes in inhibitory signaling, excitatory transmission, arousal systems, and large-scale coordination. They can markedly reduce responsiveness and, under appropriate conditions, the likelihood of connected awareness, often without permanent disruption of gross brain anatomy (Brown et al., 2010; Kelz & Mashour, 2019; Mashour, 2024). This reversible transition demonstrates that structural continuity does not fix the conscious state at each moment.
The inference must nevertheless be stated carefully. Unresponsiveness is not equivalent to proven absence of experience. Some anesthetized or deeply sedated individuals report dreams or other experiences, and the possibility of consciousness disconnected from the immediate environment must be distinguished from awareness of surgical events (Sanders et al., 2012; Noreika et al., 2011). Anesthesia therefore does not establish that the “mind disappears” whenever the patient ceases to respond. It establishes a more defensible claim: pharmacologically induced physiological changes can profoundly alter the relationship among responsiveness, reportability, network function, and subjective experience without destroying the basic anatomical scaffold.
Nor does recovery after anesthesia show that an individual’s personal identity was literally extinguished and recreated. On the contrary, the routine return of language, habits, autobiographical capacities, and ordinary social recognition indicates substantial persistence of the organism and its cognitive organization across a period in which conscious access to the environment was altered or absent. We should distinguish interruption of a conscious episode from interruption of personal identity. Neither neuroscience nor philosophy warrants the inference that the same person ceases to exist whenever conscious experience is not reportable.
Anesthesia is therefore informative precisely because it separates issues too easily conflated: anatomical continuity, functional integration, external responsiveness, subjective experience, and continuity of the person. Any theory that treats them as a single variable cannot adequately describe the clinical phenomenon.
5. The Difference Between Level, Content, and Character of Consciousness
A theory of consciousness must specify what it seeks to explain. The level or availability of consciousness concerns whether experiences occur and under which conditions they can be reported or expressed. The content of consciousness concerns what is experienced: a face, pain, a thought, a remembered place. Its phenomenal character concerns how that experience feels. The continuity of personal identity concerns a different relation: the persistence of an individual across changing psychological states. These are related but not interchangeable problems.
Contemporary theories emphasize different explananda. Global neuronal workspace approaches examine how representations gain widespread availability for cognitive operations and report (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). Integrated information theory proposes a different account of the physical substrates of phenomenal experience (Tononi et al., 2016). Work on the neural correlates of consciousness distinguishes mechanisms directly involved in experience from background conditions, such as arousal, that enable relevant neural systems to function (Koch et al., 2016). None of these positions is settled, and the Biochemical Continuity Problem is not offered as their replacement.
Instead, it asks where biochemical state belongs within their explanations. Does a molecular perturbation alter a background condition for conscious processing, the mechanisms carrying particular contents, or both? If a drug changes conscious experience, is its decisive effect a modification of circuit dynamics, altered integration, changed access, or a more specific molecular requirement? Answering this cannot be accomplished by naming the drug; it requires causal experiments linking a particular intervention to neural dynamics and carefully assessed subjective reports.
The claim that chemistry matters to consciousness is therefore stronger than a metaphor but weaker than a complete theory. Chemistry can change the functional organization through which experiences are supported; it does not follow that the qualitative nature of experience is directly determined by a unique biochemical mixture. A causal account must remain multilevel.
6. Psychiatry and the Modulation of Lived Experience
Psychiatric medicine offers a different perspective because much of its clinical significance lies in altered affect, perception, salience, motivation, and self-evaluation rather than in straightforward loss of responsiveness. In depressive episodes, the world may lose its anticipated rewards; in mania, confidence, tempo of thought, and goal-directed activity can change; in psychosis, attribution of significance and judgments about reality may be profoundly altered. These are alterations of lived experience that cannot be read directly from a static diagram of neuronal connections.
Yet it would be equally mistaken to describe psychiatric disorders as purely chemical disturbances occurring in otherwise unchanged brains. Psychiatric conditions reflect heterogeneous interactions among developmental history, stress, learning, neurobiology, social conditions, and psychological processes. Molecular interventions can alter symptoms, but their clinical effects can also involve downstream plasticity, changes in networks, and environmental or interpersonal factors. The familiar shorthand that depression is simply caused by a serotonin deficiency is not an established account of depressive illness; systematic reviews have not supported such a simple causal formulation (Moncrieff et al., 2023).
The relevance to the present argument is more disciplined. Pharmacological and psychiatric observations show that the expression of a personal world depends on state-sensitive neural function. The same remembered event can acquire different emotional significance depending on mood; threat evaluation changes with anxiety and arousal; attention and motivational salience alter which information becomes functionally dominant. The persistence of autobiographical representations does not guarantee a fixed interpretation of them.
A person in an altered affective state is not a different person in the numerical or moral sense. Neither disability nor psychiatric diagnosis nullifies identity, agency, or dignity. What may change is access to memories, self-appraisal, the felt significance of possibilities, and the expression of established dispositions. Here the architecture of a life and the current physiology through which that life is experienced meet. The neurochemical ecology of consciousness is relevant not because it displaces personal history, but because it helps explain the state-dependence of its expression.
7. The Brain’s Ecology Extends into the Body
The brain does not generate its physiological conditions independently of the organism. Afferent pathways carry information from viscera and vessels; endocrine signals convey aspects of stress, reproductive, and metabolic state; immune mediators influence neural function; sleep and circadian physiology organize temporal changes in arousal and performance. The relationship is reciprocal: neural activity also influences hormones, autonomic control, immune function, and behavior. The central nervous system is anatomically protected without being physiologically self-sufficient.
Research on interoception has emphasized the neural processing of internal bodily signals and their relationships with feeling, attention, and behavior. Critchley and Harrison (2013) reviewed multiple routes by which visceral states influence the brain. Seth and Friston (2016) offered a theoretical account linking interoceptive inference to emotion and self-related experience. These perspectives do not establish that subjective experience is literally located outside the brain; they demonstrate that a satisfactory account of brain function cannot ignore the regulatory exchanges through which the brain operates in a body.
The immune system provides another concrete illustration. Peripheral inflammatory processes can produce fatigue, altered motivation, reduced appetite, changed sleep, and other features of sickness behavior through multiple signaling pathways (Dantzer et al., 2008). Such effects show that changes in bodily biology can modify the conditions of lived experience even in the absence of extensive brain injury. Their significance for consciousness is indirect but real: arousal, affective tone, motivation, and bodily feeling form part of what people experience and report.
Circadian and sleep-related regulation are similarly instructive. Day–night rhythms do not replace the brain’s wiring every twenty-four hours, yet they change alertness, cognitive performance, and access to conscious contents. The central challenge is to explain how enduring networks operate across fluctuating physiological regimes. The language of biochemical continuity must therefore refer to maintained regulatory competence, not to frozen concentrations of molecules. Healthy continuity depends upon structured variation and the capacity to return to viable operating conditions.
8. The Biochemical Continuity Problem: A Multilevel Formulation
The core problem can now be stated precisely: what properties of a living neural system must persist, or remain recoverable, for its organized activity to support conscious states over time? The phrase remain recoverable is important. Conscious experience can be interrupted without preventing the later return of wakeful functioning; daily sleep itself would otherwise refute the proposed framework. Biochemical continuity cannot mean an uninterrupted stream of the same conscious content, a stable neurotransmitter level, or perpetual waking.
For conceptual clarity, distinguish four interdependent levels. Structural continuity is the persistence of relevant cellular and network organization. Physiological continuity is the maintenance or recoverability of the cellular conditions required for signaling: gradients, metabolism, receptor function, and homeostatic regulation. Dynamical continuity concerns the capacity of these elements to generate coordinated patterns implicated in particular conscious states. Personal continuity concerns the persistence of autobiographical, psychological, embodied, and relational organization across time. These levels are analytically distinct; they are not independent substances.
We can express the explanatory challenge in a schematic, non-reductive form:
X(t + Δt) = F[X(t), A(t), M(t), B(t), U(t)], where X denotes neural dynamical state, A structural and cellular constraints, M local electrochemical and neuromodulatory conditions, B organismic regulation, and U relevant internal and external inputs. A theory of the measurable correlates of consciousness must then relate observable features of X and its interactions to operationalized measures of conscious state and content. This expression is a conceptual state-space schema, not an experimentally fitted equation or a demonstrated law. It is useful because an anatomical map, A, cannot by itself yield the time-varying dynamics of the full system.
The proposal has a weak and a strong interpretation. The weak, empirically supported interpretation holds that anatomy alone is an insufficient description of moment-to-moment conscious functioning; physiology and dynamics must be considered. The strong, unresolved interpretation holds that the preservation or reconstitution of a particular biochemical organization is necessary for the persistence of the same experiencing subject, even if another system reproduces relevant functions. Current evidence does not establish this stronger claim. It cannot be treated as a conclusion of the anesthetic or psychiatric literature.
In the broader framework of Neurotenacity, the value of the problem is to prevent an unwarranted leap from preserved connectivity to preserved subjectivity. Neural persistence may maintain information-bearing capacities, but the continued expression of those capacities depends on a viable operating system. Neither statement decides the metaphysical criteria for personal survival.
9. The Strongest Counterargument: Perhaps Function Is Enough
The most serious objection does not deny neurochemistry. It argues that chemistry matters because of the causal functions it performs. If a nonbiological system could reproduce all relevant interactions, state transitions, regulation, and information processing, why assume it would need the same molecules? To insist on actual neurotransmitters rather than functional equivalents might confuse a biological implementation with the computational or dynamical properties that matter to experience.
This functionalist challenge is substantial. It shows why the Biochemical Continuity Problem must not be recast as the assertion that consciousness requires carbon-based tissue or that artificial consciousness is impossible. The available evidence supports claims about the biological conditions of human conscious states, not a universal impossibility theorem for alternative substrates. An appropriately detailed simulation might need to reproduce the effects of chemistry without literally containing dopamine or GABA molecules. Whether such reproduction is sufficient for phenomenal experience remains contested.
There is an additional challenge: neural functions can sometimes be preserved or restored despite changes in their molecular or cellular implementations. Biological systems exhibit compensation, degeneracy, and homeostatic regulation. The continuity of a function need not entail the exact preservation of every microscopic state. Conversely, precisely the same structural connections can support meaningfully different dynamics. The defensible target is therefore causally relevant multilevel organization, not molecule-by-molecule immutability.
A further criticism concerns explanatory reach. The identification of conditions necessary for ordinary waking consciousness does not by itself explain why any physical process is accompanied by experience. The distinction between neural correlates, causal enabling mechanisms, and a philosophical explanation of subjective existence remains unresolved (Koch et al., 2016; Tononi et al., 2016). The proposed framework should be judged by the additional discriminations and predictions it enables, not by its ability to solve this entire philosophical problem through terminology alone.
10. How Could the Hypothesis Be Tested?
A useful framework must do more than redescribe familiar observations. Four lines of investigation could place the Biochemical Continuity Problem under empirical pressure while respecting the limits of present measurement.
First, compare structural and multilevel predictors of state. In longitudinal human studies, anatomical connectivity, electrophysiology, physiological variables, and available noninvasive markers of neuromodulatory or metabolic state could be combined with standardized tasks and carefully obtained reports. The question is whether adding physiological state improves predictions of responsiveness, experienced content, and recovery trajectories beyond anatomical and functional-network measures alone. Improvements must be assessed out of sample, using prospective designs; simply increasing the number of predictors is not evidence for a new principle.
Second, exploit reversible state transitions. Anesthetic induction and emergence, ordinary sleep and awakening, and pharmacologically induced changes in arousal offer within-person contrasts during which large-scale anatomy is relatively stable. A rigorous analysis should distinguish loss of behavioral responsiveness, loss of connected awareness, and the presence of internally generated experiences. Reports obtained after recovery, when feasible, should be interpreted with sensitivity to impaired memory encoding and the possibility of unreported experience. These designs are particularly well suited to dissociating anatomical persistence from dynamical availability (Mashour, 2024; Sanders et al., 2012).
Third, intervene selectively on physiology. Animal studies and ethically approved human protocols can examine whether changes in specific neuromodulatory systems alter network transitions and experienced state more than predicted by changes in gross connectivity. Mechanistic models should incorporate receptor distribution, changes in neural gain, and the causal pathways through which drug action alters communication. The key comparison is not chemistry versus networks, but whether physiology contributes explanatory power that static connectivity cannot supply.
Fourth, distinguish retention from reactivation. Memory experiments could measure the preservation of learned information separately from its expression across altered arousal or biochemical states. Recovery after a state change would support a distinction between latent informational capacity and momentary accessibility; it would not establish that the individual had remained consciously aware throughout the inaccessible period. Nor could a return of remembered content demonstrate continuity of a metaphysically identical subject.
The hypothesis would lose scientific value if it merely declared every result compatible with “ecology.” A meaningful empirical failure would occur if structural and network-dynamical measures, once correctly specified, captured the target transitions without additional contribution from independently measured regulatory variables. Conversely, a reproducible, causal improvement from physiologically explicit models would justify the claim that the relevant levels of explanation had been underspecified. The ambition is explanatory precision, not automatic victory for a preferred metaphor.
11. Preservation, Whole-Brain Emulation, and the Identity Question
The question “what must be preserved?” acquires special force in discussions of brain preservation and whole-brain emulation. A detailed connectomic record could preserve anatomical information. That would not demonstrate preserved cellular viability, functional memory, a capacity for renewed consciousness, or the continuation of a particular person. Each proposition requires additional evidence. Today there is no validated procedure that preserves or transfers an individual human consciousness through reconstruction or emulation.
A complete account of preservation would need to distinguish the persistence of material organization, the capacity for physiological reactivation, the reconstruction of cognitive function, the occurrence of subjective experience, and the much more difficult claim of numerical personal identity. These distinctions matter because a replica could, in principle, exhibit behavior and memory similar to an original while leaving open philosophical questions about which subject, if any, continues. Conversely, ordinary recovery from anesthesia gives no reason to regard a patient as a replica of a formerly existing self.
The original manuscript’s image of the orchestra and its score clarifies the first distinction: notation does not itself constitute performance. But its analogy also has limits. A score can be interpreted by different orchestras; a brain is an embodied system whose material constitution constrains its own dynamics. We cannot infer from the metaphor that either the original molecules are indispensable to identity or that a different substrate would necessarily fail. Both conclusions exceed present evidence.
The scientific contribution is therefore a constraint on future claims: a preservation technique cannot be called a preservation of consciousness merely because it retains an anatomical diagram. Its advocates would need to demonstrate functional restoration and develop credible criteria for assessing conscious experience. Whether those criteria establish the survival of the same subject would remain a further philosophical question, not an automatic result of technical achievement.
12. Limits of the Proposal and Its Place in Neurotenacity
Several limitations require explicit acknowledgment. First, the term neurochemical ecology is a unifying conceptual device; it does not identify a novel chemical system or independently establish a causal theory of consciousness. Second, some biochemical variables are enabling conditions of neural function, whereas others may participate more directly in specifying particular experiences; the framework does not yet assign those roles exhaustively. Third, evidence from reversible anesthesia or altered mood cannot be generalized without qualification to severe brain injury, irreversible loss of tissue, or speculative scenarios of technological preservation.
Fourth, physiological continuity is not equivalent to chemical constancy. Healthy nervous systems depend on fluctuations, reciprocal feedback, and compensatory mechanisms. A demand to freeze the molecular state of a living brain would contradict its ordinary functioning. Fifth, current measurements cannot track every causally relevant molecular variable in vivo while simultaneously resolving consciousness with perfect reliability. This places practical limits on the hypothesis’s falsifiability and calls for modest, targeted experimental claims.
Within Neurotenacity, this essay extends—not overturns—the original architectural intuition. Persistence of cellular and network organization may be indispensable to accumulated history; nevertheless, the expression of that history depends upon a changing yet regulated biological process. The proper question is not whether neurons or chemistry are more fundamental in isolation. It is how enduring organization, physiological competence, and functional dynamics jointly make possible the experiences through which a life is lived.
Conclusion: Beyond the Silent Connectome
A brain is not merely the diagram of its connections. Its capacity to perceive, remember, feel, and respond depends upon electrochemical activity unfolding within a regulated organism. Neuromodulation can transform the operation of surviving circuits; anesthesia and sleep expose the difference between stable anatomy and changing conscious state; psychiatric and interoceptive research show how the experienced world depends upon physiological conditions far beyond a fixed wiring diagram.
These observations support the weak but consequential form of the Biochemical Continuity Problem: preserving structure does not, by itself, specify or guarantee the physiological conditions of conscious activity. They do not establish that the same biochemical molecules must remain present across time, that a period without responsive consciousness destroys personal identity, or that an alternative physical system could never support experience. Those stronger claims remain unsettled.
The central achievement of a continuity-based science of mind would be to explain not only what endures, but what enduring organization can still do. A preserved score is not a symphony, yet the music is not independent of the instruments or the performers. Likewise, neural architecture and neurochemical dynamics should not be set against one another. They are dimensions of a living process whose organization makes memory possible and whose regulated activity makes experience possible. The challenge is no longer simply to preserve the brain’s architecture. It is to understand the conditions under which an enduring architecture can continue—or become able again—to sustain a conscious life.
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